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HAS HOCKEY BEEN "CHECKED FROM BEHIND" NORTH OF THE
BORDER? UNRUH, ZAPF, AND CANADA'S PARTICIPANT
LIABILITY STANDARD
I. INTRODUCTION
During a meaningless exhibition hockey game on March 7,
1990, Steve Webber checked' Melvin Unruh from behind, causing
Unruh to careen headfirst into the boards.2 Ultimately, Webber
checked Unruh right into a wheelchair. Unruh broke his neck in
the accident, rendering him a C4 quadriplegic.3 Webber's thought-
less act did far more than cripple a fellow competitor during an
otherwise forgettable hockey game. Indeed, Webber's act may
soon become the check heard 'round the Canadian hockey world.
Unruh is not the first athlete to sustain a major spinal injury
while playing hockey.4 Unruh, however, collected "perhaps the
largest [damage award] in Canadian sports-injury history."' On
I. "'[C]hecking' refers to the act of impeding the progress of a player with the
puck ... by blocking his progress with your body .... " JACK FALLA, HOCKEY: LEARN
TO PLAY THE MODERN WAY 125 (1994); see BARRY DREAYER, TEACH ME SPORTS:
HOCKEY 85 (1995).
2. Unruh v. Webber, 98 D.L.R.4th 294, 295 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1992).
3. Factum of the Respondent and Factum on Cross-Appeal at 29, Unruh v. Webber,
88 B.C.L.R.2d 353 (1994)(No. CA016412). A quadriplegic is a person who suffers from
paralysis in all four limbs. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1303 (25th ed. 1990). The
term "C4" refers to the fourth cervical vertebra. A C4 quadriplegic suffers paralysis as a
result of damage to his or her spinal cord at the C4 vertebra. Patrick J. Bishop & Richard
P. Wells, Cervical Spine Fractures: Mechanisms, Neck Loads, and Methods of Prevention,
in SAFETY IN ICE HOCKEY 71, 71-73 (C.R. Castaldi et al. eds., 1989); JACOB GREEN,
COMMON HEAD, NECK, AND BACK INJURIES 59 (1988).
4. Between 1966 and 1991, 182 hockey players suffered spinal injuries in North
America. Ninety-four percent of these injuries occurred in Canada. Approximately 106
players suffered spinal cord injuries, and nearly half of these players sustained complete
or partial paralysis. Charles H. Tator et al., Spinal Injuries in Ice Hockey: Review of 182
North American Cases and Analysis of Etiologic Factors, in SAFETY IN ICE HOCKEY:
SECOND VOLUME 11, 11-15 (C.R. Castaldi et al. eds., 1993).
5. Rick Berg, Canada Tries to Halt Checking from Behind in Hockey, SPORTS LAW.
(Sports Lawyers Ass'n, Racine, Wisconsin), July-Aug. 1995, at 7,7. In 1992, Unruh's award
represented the largest sports-based tort damage award in Canadian history. Don
Campbell, CAHA Faces Crisis in Rising Insurance, OTTAWA CITIZEN, May 2,1993, at B2,
available in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 6837438. A subsequent case exceeded Unruh's award.
See infra note 144 and accompanying text. One commentator notes that "[a]lthough sports
activity sometimes causes severe injury requiring substantial awards, judgments in Canada
do not approach the gargantuan dimensions of decisions in the United States, where the
legal and social tradition is different." JOHN BARNES, SPORTS AND THE LAW IN CANADA
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November 6, 1992, the court awarded Unruh a stunning verdict of
approximately $3.75 million plus costs. 6  On March 2, 1994, the
British Columbia Court of Appeals denied Webber's appeal and
increased the award to approximately $4 million.7 When the
Supreme Court of Canada upheld the case six months later,
Webber's hit threatened to radically alter the way amateur hockey
is played in Canada.8
Participant liability presents tough issues for courts today.9
Contact sports like hockey necessarily involve violent physical
collisions. Indeed, one of the goals of hockey is to physically
dominate and intimidate the opposing team as a means to
achieving victory. One commentator notes that "[m]ost human
interaction is predicated upon nonviolence and due care; sports
activities, however, often result in injury caused by one player to
another. In some 'contact' sports, infliction of pain and injury is
expected and. even encouraged by coaches, fans and the players
themselves."'" A well-executed check is an integral part of
hockey, even though it may result in injury. Outside the sports
context, the same act would constitute battery.
248-49 (2d ed. 1988).
6. Unruh v. Webber, 88 B.C.L.R.2d at 355. Unruh received exactly $3,761,090.81 plus
costs. Id. Paralysed Player Gets $4M, EDMONTON J., Nov. 8, 1992, at C2, available in
WESTLAW, 1992 WL 6785475. Four days after Unruh's victory in court, Bill Zapf met
with a similar fate, suffering a broken neck after being checked from behind. The holding
in Zapf v. Muckalt reaffirmed the Unruh court's rationale. Zapf v. Muckalt, 11 B.C.L.R.3d
296 (Sup. Ct. 1995); Chris Welner, Hockey Hit Breaks City Teen's Neck, EDMONTON J.,
Nov. 10, 1992, at D1, available in WESTLAW, 1992 WL 6785901.
7. Larry Still, Hockey Player Liable for Paralysis of Opponent, VANCOUVER SUN,
Mar. 3,1994, at B8, available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 6233316. Composed of both federal
and provincial courts, the Canadian court system is a blend of the "unitary system of
England and the federal system of the U.S.A." PATRICK FITZGERALD & KING MCSHANE,
LOOKING AT LAW: CANADA'S LEGAL SYSTEM 33 (1979). Each province contains a
supreme court, which is divided into trial and appellate divisions. Cases are tried at the
trial division and appealed to the appellate division. The Supreme Court of Canada hears
final appeals. Slight variations exist in the judicial hierarchies in Quebec, Ontario, and
Alberta. Id. at 33-40; GERALD L. GALL, THE CANADIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 150-51 (1990).
8. Unruh v. Webber, 93 B.C.L.R.2d xxxviii (Can.), dismissing appeal from 88
B.C.L.R.2d 353 (1994). Bruce Cheadle, Settlement of $4 Million May Prompt Change in
Hockey Insurance Practices, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Sept. 9, 1994, at D6, available in
WESTLAW, 1994 WL 6769304; Kevin Griffin, Injured Hockey Player to Get $4.8 Million,
VANCOUVER SUN, Sept. 9, 1994, at B1, available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 6234846.
9. "Participant liability" refers to tort liability amongst co-participants in sports.
Daniel E. Lazaroff, Torts and Sports: Participant Liability to Co-Participants for Injuries
Sustained During Competition, 7 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 191, 194 (1990).
10. Id. at 194.
642 [Vol. 18:641
Participant Liability Standard
Participant liability cases involve inherent conflict.
Confronted with these cases, Canadian judges must decide whether
hockey players accept the risk of injury or whether simple
negligence applies. A jurisdictional split in applying the negligence
standard further confuses this issue. British Columbia applies a
simple negligence standard." The other Canadian provinces
apply a negligence standard but combine it with a seemingly
contradictory intent requirement." Finally, policy issues cloud the
participant liability issue as well.
This Note examines the split among Canadian jurisdictions on
which standard to apply and recommends -options for repairing the
schism. Part II presents Canadian tort law and surveys case law
defining the standard of care for co-participants in sporting
activities. Part IH documents the rash of spinal cord injuries in
Canadian amateur hockey and looks at the Canadian Amateur
Hockey Association's attempt to curb the problem. Part IV
discusses the Unruh case and analyzes the court's application of. the
negligence standard. Part V analyzes the Zapf case and the
consequences of the Unruh and Zapf.decisions for Canadian
amateur hockey. Part VI 'evaluates the Canadian courts' ap-
plication of the participant liability standard in general. Part VII
examines alternative approaches to participant liability, including
the U.S. recklessness approach and the Canadian negligence
standard. Part VIII concludes that Canadian courts should adopt
the U.S. recklessness standard for participant liability cases.
II. BACKGROUND ON CANADIAN PARTICIPANT LIABILITY
Generally speaking, when a player is injured in the sporting
arena, the injury is the result of either an intentional or a negligent
blow. Thus, in participant liability cases, Canadian courts may
apply either an intentional tort analysis or a negligence analysis.'3
A. Intentional Torts
Intentional tort cases in sports usually involve incidents
where players step outside their role as fellow competitors and
11. Unruh v. Webber, 88 B.C.L.R.2d 353, 368 (1994); see infra part II.B.
12. See infra part II.B.
13. BARNES, supra note 5, at 247-48; see also 1 G.H.L. FRIDMAN, THE LAW OF TORTS
IN CANADA 64,364 (1989).
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seek to inflict injury on an opponent.' 4
Intentional or deliberate acts are those which achieve a desired
purpose or which involve a consequence that is substantially
certain'. Battery and assault are torts involving deliberate
interference with other people's bodily security. A person
commits battery who intentionally makes direct or indirect
physical contact, however slight, with the person of another, the
offensiveness being in the eyes of the recipient.... The tort of
assault involves the physical threatening of contact through
actions which make a victim reasonably apprehensive that harm
is about to follow ....
In addition to civil suits, criminal prosecution for battery and
assault is common.' 6
Defendants in intentional tort cases may raise the defense of
consent (i.e. assumption of risk) in an effort to evade liability."7
To prove plaintiff's consent, the defendant must show "that the
plaintiff freely and with awareness of what was involved gave his
agreement to the actions of the defendant.""8 One commentator
notes that "[p]articipation in contact sports is taken to involve
consent to the ordinary blows and collisions necessarily incidental
to play, including contact which is in breach of game rules."' 9
Consent is either implied from conduct or expressly stated or
written.20 A successful consent defense completely bars plaintiff's
recovery.
21
The leading Canadian case involving an intentional tort in
sports is Agar v. Canning.' In Agar, the plaintiff hooked the
14. BARNES, supra note 5, at 250; see also FRIDMAN, supra note 13, at 44-45.
15. BARNES, supra note 5, at 250; see also FRIDMAN, supra note 13, at 44-45.
16. BARNES, supra note 5, at 251; John Barnes, Recent Developments in Canadian
Sports Law, 23 OTrAWA L. REV. 623, 680-89 (1991). See generally R.C. Watson, Athletes
Beware: Legal Reasons to Play Fair, 3 EDUc. LJ. 167, 179 (1991) (arguing that the
Canadian criminal code sets "limits to assaultive behaviour in sports"); Diane V. White,
Note, Sports Violence as Criminal Assault: Development of the Doctrine by Canadian
Courts, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1030, 1034-35 (noting that Canadian prosecutors have effectively
used the criminal code to sanction violent behavior in sports).
17. BARNES, supra note 5, at 251.
18. FRIDMAN, supra note 13, at 63.
19. BARNES, supra note 5, at 251; see also FRIDMAN, supra note 13, at 64. But see
ALLEN M. LINDEN, CANADIAN TORT LAW 62 (5th ed. 1993) (asserting that competitors
only implicitly consent to contact that is within the rules).
20. BARNES, supra note 5, at 251.
21. LINDEN, supra note 19, at 61.
22. 54 W.W.R. 302 (Man. Q.B. 1965), aff'd 55 W.W.R. 384 (Man. 1966).
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defendant around the neck, and the defendant responded by
slashing the plaintiff -in the face, rendering him unconscious.'
The Agar court noted that hockey entails violent contact and that
participants accept certain risks of injury.24 The court indicated,
however, that a player's immunity is limited: "[I]njuries inflicted
in circumstances which show a definite resolve tb cause serious
injury to another, even if there is provocation and in the heat of
the game, should not fall within the scope of implied consent."'
Although the plaintiff was contributorily negligent for provoking
the incident, the defendant's intentional act exceeded any implied
consent and constituted battery.2 6 According to one commen-
tator, "subsequent cases have similarly found amateur hockey
players liable for intentional violent blows to playing oppo-
nents."27
B. The Negligence Standard
Canadian courts may also review participant liability cases
under a negligence standard.' One commentator notes that "[a]
23. Id. at 302-03. Hockey players define "hooking" as swinging a hockey stick from
the handle in an effort to snare an opposing player with the curved end. FALLA, supra
note 1. at 21. Hooking allows defending players to slow and harass opposing players when
they are carrying the puck. Id Under the rules, a player may not "hook" an opposing
player for more than a few seconds at a time. Id. Hockey norms dictate that hooking is
proper below the waist, although the rules implicitly allow a player to hook above the waist
if he does it in a repetitious harassing way and if he does not pull down the opposing
player as a result. Id. Any attempt to hook a player above the waist is subject to a
penalty for hooking or slashing. Id. "Slashing" occurs when a player swings his stick in
an attempt to hit another player. Id. A referee may call slashing if he decides that the
player possessed an intent to injure. Id.
24. Agar, 54 W.W.R. at 304.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 304-06; BARNES, supra note 5, at 252.-
27. BARNES, supra note 5, at 252 & n.25; see Holt v. Vergruggen, 20 C.C.L.T. 29,37-39
(B.C. Sup. Ct. 1982) (holding the defendant liable for slashing an opposing player); Martin
v. Daigle, 6 D.L.R.3d 634, 635-36 (N.B. 1969) (imposing liability for blows struck iii the
course of a game); Pettis v. McNeil, 8 C.C.L.T. 299, 299-303 (N.S. Sup. Ct. 1979) (finding
liability for an intentional stick blow to the plaintiff's head). But see Gaudet v. Sullivan,
128 N.B.R.2d 409, 423 (Q.B. 1992) (dismissing assault and battery claim where the
defendant allegedly cross-checked the plaintiff in the face after finding no violation of the
rules coupled with the intent to injure). The courts have also found participants liable for
intentional blows in other sports. Colby v. Schmidt, 37 C.C.L.T. 1, 3,6 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1986)
(holding the defendant rugby player liable for an intentional blow to the plaintiff's head
after the play); Siebolts v. Wilson, 33 A.C.W.S.2d 130 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1985) (finding liability
for a retaliatory punch in a soccer game); Conger v. Gianoli, 88 Sask. R. 299, 301 (Q.B.
1991) (imposing liability for intentional acts outside the accepted customs in softball).
28. BARNES, supra note 5, at 247-48; see also FRIDMAN, supra note 13, at 364.
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claim in negligence involves the allegation that the defendant failed
to exercise due care towards persons who could reasonably be
foreseen to be affected by his conduct."29 To prevail, a plaintiff
must show that the defendant breached a duty owed to the plaintiff
and that the breach caused the resulting injury.3" The circumstan-
ces surrounding the activity heavily influence whether courts apply
an intentional tort or negligence standard.
With vigorous contact sports such as soccer, hockey and football,
play necessarily involves heavy blows and collisions, so that it is
difficult to define possible negligent acts between participants;
similarly, the speed of play may make it hard to prove lack of
due care in a particular incident. Liability has traditionally been
limited to assaults that exceed the implied consent in the game,
but some recent cases invoke negligence principles in respect of
intentional or reckless acts.32
Defendants in negligence actions may raise two defenses:
voluntary assumption of risk and inherent risk in sports.33
Depending on the circumstances surrounding the injury, a
defendant may raise either of these defenses or both. Volenti non
fit injuria' (volenti or voluntary assumption of risk) is a consent
defense to negligence.35 To successfully raise this defense, a
defendant must prove that the plaintiff "willingly ran a risk that
was fully understood."36
One Canadian jurist, however, argues that the Supreme Court
of Canada has narrowed volenti to apply only to situations of
29. BARNES, supra note 5, at 254. See generally STEPHEN BIRD & JOHN ZAUHAR,
RECREATION AND THE LAW 33-35 (1993) (discussing negligence liability). For a discussion
of participant liability in England, see Simon Gardiner & Alexandra Felix, Juridification
of the Football Field: Strategies for Giving Law the Elbow, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 189, 206-
09 (1995).
30. BARNES, supra note 5, at 254-55.
31. Id. at 258.
32. Id. at 261.
33. Id. at 255.
34. The term volenti non fit injuria means "[nlo wrong is done to a person who
consents to being injured." FRIDMAN, supra note 13, at 352.
35. Id. Volenti, like consent, can be express or implied. Implied assumption of risk
cases pose the greatest difficulty to courts because "mere knowledge of the danger is not
enough for the volenti defence to be applied."- LINDEN, supra note 19, at 458; see also
BARNES, supra note 5, at 255.
36. BARNES, supra note 5, at 255.
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express consent or where implied consent is clear.37 Moreover,
Professor Fridman asserts that the volenti defense is unavailable in
participant liability cases. 8 Professor Fridman persuasively argues
that a player consents to a number of inherent risks when that
player steps *into the sporting arena, but those risks that derive
from another player's negligence are outside the scope of the
consent.39 Thus, volenti only applies to situations where the
parties' implicit consent is not as obvious as within the sporting
arena. 0 The plaintiff's contributory negligence, however, may still
be a factor in reducing the defendant's liability, even if volenti is
unavailable.4 l
The inherent risk defense is available if the
injury arises from a normal and reasonable practice inherent in
the game .... Such injuries are regarded as mere accidents
whose costs must be borne by the victim. The value of sports
derives from their inherent conflict, speed, exertion and physical'
contact. The occasional accident is the price paid by the
player ... for the benefits of sports.42
Although Canadian courts analyze participant liability under
an ordinary negligence standard, the standard of care varies with
the circumstances and nature of the sport. Conduct that would be
deemed negligent if engaged in "on the street" may not constitute
a breach of ordinary care in the sporting arena.43  One commen-
tator notes that "where a game is played at high speed in a
37. LINDEN, supra note 19, at 459-60 (citing Lagasse v. Rural Municipality of Ritchot,
[1973] 4 W.W.R. 181 (Man. Q.B.)). The Lagasse court held that "[n]othing will suffice
short of an agreement to waive any claim for negligence." Lagasse, 4 W.W.R. at 189
(quoting Nettleship v. Weston, 3 All E.R. 581, 587 (C.A. 1971)). "This restrictive view of
volenti means that courts rarely invoke the defence nowadays." LINDEN, supra note 19,
at 460.
38. FRIDMAN, supra note 13, at 364-65.
39. Id.
40. Id. "The Supreme Court of Canada has recently stated that concepts like volenti
fit non injuria [sic] ... are incompatible with the concept of apportionment." Factum of
the Respondent and Factum on Cross-Appeal at 20, Unruh v. Webber, 88 B.C.L.R.2d 353
(1994)(No. CA016412) (citing Crocker v. Sundance Northwest Resorts, [1988] 1 S.C.R.
1186, 1202 (Can.)); see also Hall v. Hebert, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 159, 207 (Can.) (holding that
"for the doctrine of volenti to apply .... both parties to the activity must have agreed that
they would participate in it regardless of the risk of injury and give up their right to sue
should injury occur as a result of the agreed upon activity."); Dube v. Labar, [1986] 1
S.C.R. 649, 658 (Can.).
41. FRIDMAN, supra note 13, at 365.
42. BARNES, supra note 5. at 255.
43. Id. at 258.
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confined area, a scrupulous standard of care defeats the nature and
purpose of the activity."" Courts have not yet developed a
specific standard to apply in these cases, and the rule is hardly a
model of clarity when utilized in the rigorous sports setting.
In Temple v. Hallem,45 the Manitoba Court of Appeals
applied the negligence standard in conjunction with a seemingly
inconsistent "intent to injure" focus and did not find liability. In
Temple, the plaintiff was a female competitor in a co-ed softball
league.46 League rules allowed sliding into the bases and penal-
ized players for blocking the base paths and obstructing runners
from reaching any of the bases.47 During a softball game, the
plaintiff attempted to field the ball and tag the runner by standing
approximately five to seven feet up the baseline." The defendant,
a male competitor, slid into the plaintiff and knocked her back-
wards, injuring her.49 The trial court imposed liability on the
ground that the defendant's "professional slide" violated league
rules.5 °
The Manitoba Court of Appeals reversed on the basis that
league rules permitted sliding.5 The appellate court also noted
that, even if the defendant had violated league rules, he could not
be held liable unless he possessed an intent to injure.52 To
buttress its opinion, the Temple court cited Agar: "[O]nly a
deliberate violation of the rules calculated to do injury will give rise
to civil liability. Otherwise people who engage in sport are
assumed to accept the risk of accidental harm."53  Thus, the
Temple court drastically reduced the defendant's duty of care in
participant liability cases. One commentator agrees that the
44. Id. at 259.
It would be inconsistent with this implied consent to impose a duty on a player
to take care for the safety of other players corresponding to the duty which, in a
normal situation, gives rise to a claim for negligence .... The conduct of a
player in the heat of the game is instinctive and unpremeditated and should not
be judged by standards suited to polite social intercourse.
Agar v. Canning, 54 W.W.R. 302,304 (Man. Q.B. 1965), affd 55 W.W.R. 384 (Man. 1966).
45. 58 D.L.R.4th 541 (Man. 1989).
46. Id. at 541. "
47. Id. at 542-43.
48. Id. at 542.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id at 543-44.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 543 (citing Agar v. Canning, 54 W.W.R. 302 (Man. Q.B. 1965)).
648 [Vol. 18:641
Participant Liability Standard
Temple court "seemed to discount negligence liability between
participants in vigorous contact sports." 4
Although Temple involved a negligence claim, the court relied
on Agar, which centered on an intentional tort claim. According
to one observer, the Temple court strained mightily to deliver this
pro-defendant opinion." Namely, how could an intentional tort
case be controlling authority in a negligence action?56 Moreover,
the Temple court gave little consideration to the intent and rule
violation elements in finding no liability.57 Temple presents the
dilemma courts must confront when deciding where to draw the
line in these cases: Does the injury stem from physical contact that
is within the accepted norms of the game, or does it derive from
unreasonable risks?
58
Although the Canadian sports cases have emphasized a
negligence standard, the aggressive nature of sports like hockey
alters the standard of care to the extent that the cases turn more
on reckless, rather than merely negligent, behavior. In other
words, the preceding line of cases demonstrate that a court will
find liability only if an actor consciously disregards an extreme risk.
Mere negligent failure to perceive a risk will not establish liability.
On the other hand, courts in British Columbia tend to apply
a simple negligence standard.59 For example, the British Colum-
bia Court of Appeals in Herok v. Wegrzanowski applied a negli-
gence standard in holding the defendant liable for hooking the
plaintiff in the face. After stealing the puck, the plaintiff passed it
54. Barnes, supra note 16, at 690; see Knockwood v. Cormier, 57 A.C.W.S.3d 1057
(N.B. Q.B. Sept. 9,1995) (imposing no liability because "[d]efendant had no premeditated
intention of causing bodily harm"). In Conger v. Gianoli, an intentional tort case, the court
noted that negligence is inherent in the nature of sports and, thus, is not actionable. 88
Sask. R. 299,.301 (Q.B. 1991).
55. Philip H. Osborne, A Review of Tort Decisions in Manitoba, 1989, 20 MAN. W.
419, 436-37 (1991).
56. Id. at 436.
57. Id. at 437.
58. Id. at 433. Canadian courts usually apply the Temple court's philosophy in
negligence actions stemming from hockey accidents. In Sexton v. Sutherland, the court
abandoned the traditional negligence analysis and found for the defendant by focusing on
the absence of an intent to injure or reckless behavior. 26 A.C.W.S.3d 472 (Ont. Gen. Div.
1991). The court held that a kidney injury suffered as a result of a check was not reckless
conduct because the defendant was not "reckless ... as to reasonable likelihood of injury
from [a] body check." Id.
59. Here, "simple negligence" means negligence without the aforementioned "intent"
requirement.
60. 34 A.C.W.S.2d 296, 296-97 (B.C. 1985).
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to a teammate and skated toward his team's bench.61 As the
plaintiff was skating away, the defendant inadvertently hooked him
in the eye.62 The court assessed the case in terms of assumption
of risk:
Looking at the nature of the league in which the parties were
participating, it is reasonable to assume the players accepted the
consequences of an unintentional injury arising from a body
check, or being struck with a puck. Occasionally a stick might
fly up into the face of another player while the two were facing
each other. These were the assumed risks.6
The Herok court defined the negligence test as follows: "[I]t
is not every careless act causing injury that will give rise to liability.
It is only careless acts quite outside the risks assumed that could be
a foundation of such liability. But that is a question of fact for
each case." 64 Accordingly, the court held that the defendant was
indeed negligent for carelessly swinging his stick without con-
sidering the size of his target or the consequences of his action.65
The Herok opinion reveals the jurisdictional split in Canada on
the issue of negligence. The British Columbia Court of Appeals
consistently applies a negligence standard in participant liability
cases.' Unruh and Zapf also impose liability based on this
standard.67 The other Canadian provinces, influenced by the Agar
holding, apply a negligence standard vis-a-vis an intent or reck-
lessness requirement. The negligence and intentional tort stan-
dards are inherently inconsistent, and their merger in this context
produces a quasi-recklessness standard.'
61. Unruh v. Webber, 88 B.C.L.R.2d 353,366 (1994) (quoting Herok v. Wegrzanowski
(Webster), Vancouver CA003074 at 3 (B.C. Oct. 7, 1985)).
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting Herok at 4-5).
64. Id. at 367 (quoting Herok at 7).
65. Id. (quoting Herok at 6).
66. See King v. Redlich, 24 D.L.R.4th 636, 637-38 (B.C. 1985) (applying a negligence
standard and not imposing-liability on a defendant who struck a plaintiff in the head with
a shot that ricocheted off a goal post during pre-game warm-ups).
67. Zapf v. Muckalt, 11 B.C.L.R.3d 296, 314-15 (Sup. Ct. 1995); Unruh v. Webber, 98
D.L.R.4th 294, 304 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1992).
68. Recklessness is conduct that surpasses ordinary negligence. Lazaroff, supra note
9, at 199-200. Cases often give little or no guidance in clarifying the recklessness standard.
According to one definition:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an
act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do,
knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man
to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm
650 [Vol. 18:641
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III. THE INCREASE IN SPINAL INJURIES IN CANADIAN HOCKEY
The Canadian Amateur Hockey Association (CAHA) is the
governing body of youth amateur hockey in Canada.69 Its many
functions include the promulgation of safety rules and infractions
designed to protect players from serious injuries." From 1948 to
1975, head injuries were more prevalent than spinal cord in-
juries.7 ' In 1975, CAHA instituted a mandatory helmet rule.72
Although the number of head traumas plummeted, spinal cord
injuries exploded at a rate of nearly fifteen per year over a twelve
year period.73 Many people attributed this trend to an invul-
nerability complex on the part of the heavily protected young
hockey players; the additional protection of helmets and face
shields encouraged players to check with reckless abandon.74
to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is
necessary to make his conduct negligent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965); see also Ray Yasser, In the Heat of
Competition: Tort Liability of One Participant to Another; Why Can't Participants Be
Required to Be Reasonable?, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 253, 257 (1995).
69. In 1994, CAHA merged with Hockey Canada to form the Canadian Hockey
Association. Cheadle, supra note 8, at D6.
70. Unruh v. Webber, 98 D.L.R.4th 294, 302 (B.C, Sup. Ct. 1992).
71. Robert M. Lee, Playing in the Danger Zone: Before 1975, Spinal Cord Injuries in
Hockey Were Rare. Then Helmets Became Mandatory: Hockey: No Equipment Will Prevent
Injuries; It's Up to the Rule-Makers, VANCOUVER SUN, Nov. 28, 1992, at B1, available in
WESTLAW, 1992 WL 5954262.
72. Id.
73. Between 1966 and 1991,173 Canadian hockey players received spinal cord injuries.
Tator et al., supra note 4, at 11-15. Unruh suffered the most common injury, according to
a study by SportSmart Canada. Webber checked Unruh from behind (33% frequency) and
propelled him headfirst into the boards (59.9% frequency), damaging Unruh's cervical
spine (75.8% frequency). lit at 12-16. Tests indicate that a "cadaver when dropped on its
head requires 150 foot-pounds of force to break its neck." Lee, supra note 71, at D6.
Skating at ten miles per hour, the typical "skating speed," a hockey player launched into
the boards headfirst will suffer an impact of six hundred foot-pounds of force. Id. "The
most tragic figure in the statistics is the age of the players. Three-quarters of those injured
were between the ages of 11 and 20." Id.; see also Bishop & Wells, supra note 3, at 71-79.
74. With the addition of protective helmets, hockey players do not need to worry about
potential head injuries when they check other players. As a result, many young players
now hurtle toward one another without any concern for personal safety. Spinal injuries
ensued from the combination of these factors. Richard Parayre, The Effect of Rules and
Officiating on the Occurrence and Prevention of Injuries, in SAFETY IN ICE HOCKEY, supra
note 3, at 37,40; Lois Kalchman, Hitting from Behind Condemned, TORONTO STAR, Nov.
13, 1993, at E3, available in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 7288194; Lee, supra note 71, at D6;
Monte Stewart, Check Stop: Millikin Calls for End to Hitting from Behind, CALGARY
HERALD, Mar. 24, 1994, at C7, available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 7518190; Sheryl
Ubelacker, Injuries Take Harsh Toll in Hockey, 15 Players Suffer Spinal Damage Each
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Unruh suffered his injury at a time when spinal injuries were
spiraling out of control in Canada. From 1988 to 1991, SportSmart
Canada uncovered sixty-two spinal injuries, with one-third of the
victims relegated to wheelchairs for life.75 Dr. Charles Tator
identified the factors contributing to the rise in spinal injuries:
inconsistent enforcement of the rules, uninformed players and
coaches, younger players' sense of invulnerability due to their
protective equipment, and younger players mimicking the aggres-
sive style of professional hockey players.76
CAHA did not wait until Unruh's injury and subsequent
lawsuit to deal with the very serious problem that checking from
behind presented. In response to the growing trend of spinal cord
injuries, in 1984, CAHA enacted Rule 53, outlawing checking from
behind:
(a) At the discretion of the Referee, a Minor or Major penalty
shall be assessed any player who intentionally pushes, body
checks, or hits an opposing player from behind in any manner,
anywhere on the ice.
(b)-A Major penalty plus a Game Misconduct penalty shall be
assessed any player who injures an opponent as a result of
"Checking that player from Behind."
(c) Where a player is high sticked, cross-checked, body-checked,
pushed, hit or propelled in any manner from behind into the
boards, in such a way that the player is unable to protect or
defend himself, a Major penalty plus a Game Misconduct
penalty shall be assessed.
(Note: Referees are instructed not to substitute other penalties
when a player is checked from behind in any manner. This rule
must be strictly enforced.)'
Year, MD Says, MONTREAL GAZrE, Jan. 24, 1992, at Al, available in WESTLAW, 1992
WL 7155148.
75. Randy Starkman, Amateur Hockey's Shocking Tol" Rash of Spinal Injuries Causing
Panic, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 19, 1992, at B1, available in WESTLAW, 1992 WL 6977834.
CAHA catalogued seventeen neck or back injuries from September 1991 to May 1992. Id.
Thirteen of the 17 back and neck injuries resulted from checks from behind that sent
players into the boards headfirst. Id.; see also Ubelacker, supra note 74, at Al.
76. Tator et al., supra note 4, at 17-18; Parayre, supra note 74, at 38-42.
77. Unruh v. Webber, 88 B.C.L.R.2d 353, 356 (1994) (quoting CAHA rules). A
"minor" penalty requires the offending player to sit out for two minutes, leaving his team
short-handed. FALLA, supra note 1, at 23. If the opposing team scores during this two
minute period, the penalty is over, and the player may re-enter the game. Id. A "major"
penalty mandates the guilty player to sit out for five minutes. Id. During this period, even
if the opposing team scores, the penalty does not expire. Id. A "game misconduct"
penalty results in an automatic ejection of the player from the game. Id. at 24.
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In 1989, CAHA rewrote and reinforced Rule 53.78 For
example, CAHA required players guilty of a Rule 53 infraction to
"write to the [CAHA and] explaini] ... why he made the illegal
check and what injury to the opponent might have resulted
... In 1990, the Pacific Coast Amateur Hockey Association
(PCAHA) adopted its own form of Rule 53, including an ad-
ditional provision imposing automatic major and game misconduct
penalties against players who hit other players from behind."0
CAHA took other measures to address the serious issue of
checking from behind. In 1988, the organization sponsored a
video, called "Smart Hockey," featuring former NHL star Mike
Bossy."1 CAHA'intended to use the video to deter checking from
behind.' In the video, Bossy says:
Do not hit another player from behind, it's a gutless type of a
check, it's very dangerous and it must be stopped. In fact, I
believe players who hit from behind like this should receive very
stiff penalties and even long term suspensions because the
injuries they cause sometimes last for life. 3
CAHA sent copies of "Smart Hockey" -to minor hockey as-
sociations across Canada in an effort to spread Bossy's important
78. Unruh v. Webber, 98 D.L.R.4th 294, 302 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1992). By comparison,
"the Amateur Hockey Association of the U.S. and Manitoba Amateur Hockey Association
have had the checking from behind rule for quite some time." Parayre, supra note 74, at
41.
79. John Deverell, Ontario Tops in Dirty Hockey, MD Says, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 24,
1992, at Al, available in WESTLAW, 1992 WL 6522466.
80. Unruh, 98 D.L.R.4th at 302. Canada's Western Hockey League (WILL) adopted
a similar policy in 1990. WHL Cracks,Down, CALGARY HERALD, Sept. 6, 1990, at D3,
available in WESTLAW, PAPERSCAN Database. But see John Lawrence, Tacoma Pro
Sports: WHL Needs to Take a Closer Look at Checking from Behind, NEWS TRIB.
(Tacoma, Wash.), Oct. 26, 1993, at C2, available in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 8766200 (urging
WHL to strengthen its checking from behind rule). CAHA's tough stance on checking
from behind coincided with the National Hockey League's (NHL) efforts to eliminate the
dangerous act. In 1991, NHL star Wayne Gretzky suffered a career-threatening back injury
after Gary Suter checked him from behind. Following this and other incidents, NHL
officials began strictly enforcing the checking from behind rule by liberally imposing game
misconduct penalties on infringers. NHL Will Crack Down on Checks from Rear; No
Change in Rule Book, But Referees Are Directed to Tighten Up, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Jan.
25, 1992, at D3, available in WESTLAW, 1992 WL 7155325.
81. Larry Still, Hockey Injury Ruined Life, Court Told, VANCOUVER SUN, Sept. 15,
1992, at Al, available in WESTLAW, 1992 WL 5944196.
82. Id. "CAHA president James Costello... told the [trial] court [in Unruh] the
association sponsored the video ... in 1988 because it was concerned about the increasing
number of spinal injuries caused by checking from behind." lt
83. Unruh, 98 D.L.R.4th at 302.
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safety message84 In the years following Unruh's injury, a number
of hockey celebrities also campaigned against hitting from behind,
in an effort to reduce spinal injuries.' As a result, spinal injuries
declined following the 1992 season.
6
IV. THE UNRUH DECISION
A. Facts
The March 7, 1990 exhibition game between the Aldergrove
hockey team and the Arbutus Club was meaningless.8s Simply
put, Arbutus was out of its league. Aldergrove had recently
topped its division (Midget "AA")" and had scheduled the
exhibition game in an effort to hone its skills and to stay focused
for the upcoming playoffs.8 9
Midway through the second period, Aldergrove defenseman
Melvin Unruh chased down a puck in a corner to the left of the
Aldergrove net.9° Arbutus forward Steve Webber followed in hot
pursuit.9' The puck rested against the boards, and Unruh was
84. Id. "Since 1984, a brochure entitled Neck and Spine Conditioning for Hockey
Players has been made available to all hockey players by the Committee [on Prevention
of Spinal Injuries Due to Hockey] .... " Tator et al., supra note 4, at 18; see also Reg
Curren, Tragedies Emphasize Need for Tougher Rules, EDMONTON J., Mar. 19, 1994, at H2,
available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 8489768; Lois Kalchman, Injury Data Sparks Call for
Education, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 25, 1992, at B2, available in WESTLAW, 1992 WL
6522686.
85. Don Cherry, a popular hockey commentator, has urged young players not to hit
from behind. He instructs players to avoid becoming the next victim by staying out of "no
man's land," the area roughly four to six feet from the boards where accidents like Unruh's
often occur. In an instructional video, Cherry called checking from behind "the most
cowardly act in hockey" and "the cheapest shot of all time." DON CHERRY'S ROCK 'EM
SOCK 'EM 6 (Molstar Communications 1994). He also urged players to stay up against the
boards and to keep their heads up to avoid injury. Id.; see also Kalchman, supra note 74,
at E3; Tom Keyser, Skating Away from Violence: Millikin Brothers Can Sense Dawning of
Anti-Goon Mood, CALGARY HERALD, Jan. 20, 1995, at G4, available in WESTLAW, 1995
WL 7285974; Stewart, supra note 74, at C7.
86. Lois Kalchman, Hockey Injuries Declining, Survey Shows, TORONTO STAR, Sept.
17, 1994, at Bi, available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 7933849; Lois Kalchman, Spinal Injuries
in Hockey Are Declining, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 30, 1995, at B1, available in WESTLAW,
1995 WL 6027921.
87. Still, supra note 81, at Al.
88. Id. Aldergrove won 22 games, lost only one, and had two ties. Id. Arbutus, on
the other hand, finished with three wins, 20 losses and two ties in a lower division (Midget
"A"). Id.
89. Id.
90. Unruh v. Webber, 98 D.L.R.4th 294, 295 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1992).
91. Id.
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about six to eight feet from the puck when Webber caught up with
him.92 Webber hit Unruh at full speed with his arms fully ex-
tended from his body.93 With his back to Webber, Unruh was
attempting to gather the puck either with his stick or his skates,
and he was defenseless at the time of the collision.94 The collision
sent Unruh hurtling into the boards headfirst.95
When Aldergrove's Cory Burns reached Unruh, he asked
Unruh if "he was okay.""6 Unruh's reply was chilling, Burns later
recalled: "'[H]e [Unruh] said he couldn't move his legs.' ' 7
Indeed, with his spinal cord severed, the injury rendered Unruh a
C4  quadriplegic.9 8  Unruh retains some sensation in his
extremities, but he is confined to a wheelchair for the rest of his
life. 99
B. Procedural Posture and the Trial Court Holding
Unruh sued Webber, Arbutus Club, Webber's coach, BCAHA,
and CAHA for eight million dollars.'0° The defendants raised a
defense of volenti non fit injuria.'0 ' They asserfed that a mere
violation of the rules did not result in per se liability."°
92. Id. at 298.
93. Id. at 298, 300.
94. Id. at 296. When a hockey player has possession of the puck, opposing players may
"check" or push the player off the puck. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. In this
case, hitting Unruh from behind was illegal whether he had the puck or not. See supra
note 77 and accompanying text (citing CAHA Rule 53). '
95. Unruh, 98 D.L.R.4th at 296. Unruh's head crashed into "a spot where the side
boards meet the corner curve" or the "end boards." Id. at 297.
96. Larry Still, Mother Weeps as Check's Result Recalled, VANCOUVER SUN, Sept. 23,
1992, at B3, available in WESTLAW, 1992 WL 5945347.
97. Id.
98. Larry Still, Victim of Hockey Injury Tells Court What Life Is Like as a
Quadriplegic, VANCOUVER SUN, Sept. 24, 1992, at B4, available in WESTLAW, 1992 WL
5945511. See discussion supra note 3.
99. Id. Webber received a major penalty for checking from behind. Unruh v. Webber,
88 B.C.L.R.2d 353, 356 (1994).
100. Still, supra note 81, at Al.
101. Unruh v. Webber, 98 D.L.R.4th 294,304 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1992). One commentator
noted that
[v]olenti is being misused when it is invoked in sports cases, except where a
F laintiff expressly contracts out of liability. When the courts say that the risk of
injury] ... is assumed by the plaintiff, that is not what they mean, they should
explain instead that there is no negligence in such a case. Hence, there can be no
consent to negligence .... Volenti should not be invoked unless someone is
negligent and wants to avoid liability on the basis of the consent of the victim.
LINDEN, supra note 19, at 464-65.
102. Unruh, 98 D.L.R.4th at 304.
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[T]here is no liability for an injury suffered during a sporting
contest unless the act causing the injury was either intentional,
in the sense that the defendant had a "definite resolve to cause
serious injury" or was reckless in that he realized the substantial
risk of injury, and nevertheless deliberately set out to run that
risk. tY 3
Rather, the defendants argued that Unruh participated in a violent,
dangerous sport that necessarily involved a high risk of injury."'
Thus, Unruh waived the right to sue for any unintentional injuries
suffered while playing hockey. 5
During the presentation of Unruh's case, a number of
witnesses confirmed the plaintiff's allegations: (1) Unnih had his
back to Webber at the time of the check; (2) Unruh was roughly
six to eight feet from the end boards at the time of impact; (3)
Webber deliberately checked Unruh; and (4) Webber could have
avoided the collision.O' Unruh testified that he knew Webber
was pursuing him.'°7 As Unruh reached the puck, he felt a "large
contact" in his upper back, which he assumed was Webber hitting
him with both hands."1 The blow knocked him off balance and
sent him into the boardsY°9
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, Judge Meredith
upheld a "no evidence" motion and dismissed all of the defendants
except Webber." ° A number of defense witnesses presented
conflicting evidence regarding the collision. Referee Howard
Jampolsky testified that the collision was merely an unavoidable
accident."' Other defense witnesses suggested differing theories
103. Id. Webber's attorney, M. James O'Grady, practiced law in Ontario and argued
the "intent" requirement of Agar, even though British Columbia used simple negligence.
Telephone Interview with Robert D. Gibbens, Barrister, Laxton & Company (Feb. 8,1996).
104. Unruh, 98 D.L.R.4th at 304.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 295-300.
107. Id. at 298-99.
108. Id at 299.
109. Id.
110. Larry Still, Coach, Club Cleared in Teen's Injury, VANCOUVER SUN, Sept. 26, 1992,
at A3, available in WESTLAW, 1992 WL 5945473; Larry Still, Three Hockey Associations
Cleared in Negligence Suit, VANCOUVER SUN, Sept. 29, 1992, at B5, available in
WESTLAW, 1992 WL 5946089.
111. Larry Still, Disabling Check an Accident, Ref Testifies: Witness Uses Hockey Stick
to Demonstrate What He Saw, VANCOUVER SUN, Oct. 1, 1992, at B14, available in
WESTLAW, 1992 WL 5946412; see also Unruh, 98 D.L.R.4th at 301 (noting that Jam-
polsky's testimony "is so at variance with the observations of the other witnesses that it
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regarding the collision: (1) Unruh saw Webber advancing and
intentionally turned his back to him at the moment of impact;" 2
(2) Unruh was in the midst of executing a "spin-o-rama""' 3 and
Webber hit him at the perfect position to launch Unruh into the
boards; and (3) Unruh, perhaps in an attempt to evade Webber,
lost his balance and was already falling into the boards when
Webber hit him."'
Ironically, Webber and another defense witness offered the
most damaging testimony. The defendant testified that Unruh was
facing the left side of his goal, not the boards, when Webber
reached him."5  Webber indicated that he legally "hip-checked"
Unruh into the boards."6 Mrs. Singbeil, a spectator at the game,
corroborated the plaintiff's version of the incident. She also
indicated that, while Webber did not maliciously attempt to injure
Unruh, he could have avoided contact.1 7  Unfortunately for
Webber, Judge Meredith heavily relied on Singbeil's testimony.
Singbeil's testimony, coupled with Webber's own admission on
cross-examination that he was aware of the consequences of
checking from behind, sealed Webber's fate."8
cannot be accepted").
112. Some critics of CAHA Rule 53 insist that coaches instruct their players to "show
their numbers" or turn their backs to advancing opponents in an effort to draw a penalty.
Problems Plague Amateur Hockey, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Nov. 30, 1993, at B8, available
in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 4161951.
113. A "spin-o-rama" involves making a quick and sharp 360 degree turn in an effort
to evade an opposing player. Unruh, 98 D.L.R.4th at 297.
114. Id. at 299-302.
115. Id. at 299.
116. Id. To execute a "hip-check," a player must bend deeply at the knees and throw
"his hip into the puck carrier's path." FALLA, supra note 1, at 138-39. The "hip-check"
is "usually done into the boards as an opponent is about to slip away." DREAYER, supra
note 1, at 85.
117. Unruh, 98 D.L.R.4th at 296. Singbeil testified, "I felt that it could have been
avoided either by stopping or changing direction or by putting the arm around Mel and
riding him into the boards. It would have been a holding penalty but they do it." Id.
118. Webber's colloquy with Unruh's attorney, John Laxton, was telling:
Q. You are aware though that if you push somebody from behind head first into
the boards there is a real risk of injury?
A. Yes.
0. And you were aware that the injury that could be caused could be a-very
serious injury?
A. Yes.
Q. And you were aware that the injury that could be caused could include even
a broken neck?
A. Yes.
Q. So you knew that special care had to be taken when you are approaching
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
Judge Meredith based liability on a theory of negligence." 9
He found Webber's check to be "thoughtless, not vicious." 120  In
addition, Judge Meredith indicated that Webber's awareness of
both the illegal nature and the potentially tragic consequences of
his act breached his duty of care to Unruh. 2 1 Judge Meredith
awarded Unruh damages in the sum of $3,761,090.81 plus costs.'
C The British Columbia Court of Appeals Affirms
Webber appealed to the appellate division of the British
Columbia Supreme Court. The parties vigorously disputed the
relevant standard of care and the appropriate application of the
standard, given the circumstances of the case. Webber urged the
court to adopt the aforementioned "reckless" definition of the
negligence standard."z
-Ultimately, the court adopted the plaintiff's proposed standard
of care:
The standard of care test is-what would a reasonable com-
petitor, in his place, do or not do. The words "in his place"
imply the need to consider the speed, the amount of body
contact and the stresses in the sport, as well as the risks the
player might reasonably be expected to take during the game,
acting within the spirit of the game and according to standards
somebody from behind when they're close to the boards?
A. Yes.
Q. And you would also know, Mr. Webber, that if you had a choice between
allowing an opposing player to get away with the puck or the choice of
stopping him by using a careless check from behind which might cause him
to go head first into the boards, you should let him get away?
A. I would use a different way of trying to stop him, yes.
Q. I take it that you knew that the rule against checking from behind was
because players in that situation are generally unable to protect themselves?
A. Yes.
Id. at 303. To emphasize that Webber knew the consequences of his actions, Judge
Meredith recounted the testimony of Aldergrove's Nathan Rempel, who stated that
Webber was very distraught in the wake of the collision. Rempel testified that Webber
told him, "'I am such an asshole. I never should have done that."' Id.
119. Id. at 295, 304.
120. Id. at 295.
121. Id.
122. Unruh v. Webber, 88 B.C.L.R.2d 353, 355 (1994).
123. The court considered the following cases in terms of their definition of the
negligence standard in sports: Woolridge v. Sumner, [1963] 2 Q.B. 43, 66-69 (Eng. C.A.);
Wilks v. Cheltenham Home Guard Motor Cycle & Light Car Club, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 668,
670-71,673-74, 675-76 (Eng.); Condon v. Basi, [1985] 1 W.L.R. 866, 867-68, 869 (Eng.); and
Herok v. Wegrzanowski (Webster), Vancouver CA003074 (B.C. Oct. 7, 1985). Unruh, 88
B.C.L.R.2d at 359-67.
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of fair play. A breach of the rules may be one element in that
issue but not necessarily definitive of the issue. 4
Webber argued that the court should not consider his breach of
league rules because it was merely "neutral."'" The appellate
court disagreed, stating that violation of a rule is not definitive, but
rather probative, and should be considered in the negligence
analysis. 2 6
Webber maintained that he had acted in the "heat of the
moment" and did not have time to react to the situation.12 7 He
insisted that he had acted as a reasonable competitor under the
circumstances."2 In refuting Webber's contention, the appellate
court recited Singbeil's testimony that Webber--even in the heat
of the moment-could have avoided the fateful check.129  The
court stated:
Webber also agreed (a) that great caution was required in
approaching an opposing player from behind who was near the
boards and (b) that given the choice of injuring the plaintiff by
hitting him from behind or letting him get away with the puck,
he should have let him get away."3°
The appellate court specifically noted that the trial court deemed
Webber's actions to be "reckless." '' Accordingly, the appellate
court agreed with the trial court's finding that Webber failed to act
as a reasonable hockey player and, thus, dismissed Webber's
appeal. 32
124. Unruh, 88 B.C.L.R.2d at 368 (emphasis in original).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 369.
132. Id. at 368-69. In the damages phase of the appeal, the appellate court increased
Unruh's award to approximately $4.16 million. Griffin, supra note 8, at Bi; Still, supra
note 7, at B8. Webber appealed the damages portion of the ruling to the Supreme Court
of Canada. That court rejected his claim without issuing an opinion on September 8, 1994.
Cheadle, supra note 8, at D6; Griffin, supra note 8, at B1.
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V. UNRUH'S PROGENY: ZAPF & SKYROCKETING INSURANCE
RATES
A. The Zapf Court and the Negligence Analysis
On November 7, 1992, Bill Zapf, a defenseman for the
Nanaimo Clippers, retraced Melvin Unruh's final skating strides
and met a similar fate."3 Zapf skated toward a puck near the
boards when Merritt Centennial forward Bill Muckalt checked him
from behind. 4 Zapf flew into the boards headfirst and suffered
quadriplegia as a result. 35  -
Zapf sued Muckalt in British Columbia.'36 The result in
Unruh paved the way for a finding of liability in Zapf. The trial
court discounted the testimony of defense witnesses (including the
linesman and referee) who uniformly stated that "[t]he two players
collided shoulder to shoulder, both facing 90 degrees to the end
boards, and the plaintiff stumbled awkwardly into the end boards
head first."'37 The court noted key distinctions between Unruh
and Zapf. Zapf anticipated the check and turned slightly to engage
in it; the referee did not assess a penalty against Muckalt for the
incident; and the check (if from behind) was an accident." s The
court reconciled these distinctions by finding that Muckalt hit Zapf
from behind, a penalty should have been called, and the accidental
nature of the incident did not excuse the negligent conduct. '39
In finding Muckalt negligent, the trial court noted:
[A]ny reasonable competitor, approaching another from the rear
at high speed near the boards, would not administer a check that
he knew or ought to have known was likely to hit a portion of
133. Larry Still, Latest 'Hockey Tragedy' Triggers Lawsuit, VANCOUVER SUN, July 13,
1993, at Al, available in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 7612996; Larry Still, 'Illegal' Hockey Hit
Led to Paralysis, VANCOUVER SUN, Apr. 25, 1995, at B1, available in WESTLAW, 1995
WL 3512897 [hereinafter Still, 'Illegal'].
134. Still, 'Illegal' supra note 133, at B1. Zapf v. Muckalt, 11 B.C.L.R.3d 296, 296-97,
309 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
135. Larry Still, Courtroom Becomes 'Rink' in Replay of Bodycheck- Witness Tells of
'Brutal Hit'from Behind, VANCOUVER SUN, Apr. 29,1995, at AS, available in WESTLAW,
1995 WL 3513479. Zapf fractured his C4 vertebra, "rendering him an incomplete
quadriplegic. He... could move his arms in all directions, although his motor power was
non-existent." Zapf, 11 B.C.L.R.3d at 297.
136. Zapf, 11 B.C.L.R.3d at 296.
137. Id. at 300-01.
138. Id. at 312-14.
139. Id. at 314-15.
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Zapf's back .... Given the standard of play expected in this
league, and the overwhelming emphasis placed on the
prohibition against checking from the rear in the area of the
boards, it is unacceptable to make contact in the manner in'
which it was done."
The trial court also noted that Muckalt was "at best, careless" and
"at worst, reckless" and that "[e]ither is sufficient to found
liability" on negligence.'41 - The trial court has not awarded
damages yet, but Zapf's award should rival or possibly exceed
Unruh's award.'42
B. The Consequences of Unruh and Zapf
The Unruh and Zapf cases render the future of Canadian
amateur hockey uncertain. Although the Unruh court dismissed
CAHA from the original suit, the organization carried insurance
that paid, on Webber's behalf all damages and costs of the
suit.'43  As Unruh advanced through the appellate process,
CAHA already owed $8 to $10 million on claims brought since
1987.'" Prior to the Unruh ruling, CAHA "paid out about
$500,000 a year to injured players."145 As a result of the Unruh
decision, CAHA's insurance premium per player nearly tripled
from $7 to $20.146 CAHA also established a $2 million cap on all
140. Larry Still, Quadriplegic to Get Damages for Hockey Hit: $4 Million Award
Predicted as Judge Asks Lawyers to Submit Arguments, VANCOUVER SUN, Sept. 6, 1995,
at B1, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 3527547.
141. Zapf, 11 B.C.L.R.3d at 314.
142. Hockey Player Found Negligent for Hit, EDMONTON J., Sept. 6, 1995, at A10,
available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 7372550.
143. Don Campbell, CAHA Faces Crisis in Rising Insurance, OTTAWA CITIZEN, May
2, 1993, at B2, available in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 6837438; Insurance Hike May Price
Youngsters Office, VANCOUVER SUN, Feb. 13, 1993, at B8, available in WESTLAW, 1993
WL 7595790 [hereinafter Insurance Hike].
144. Rick Mayoh, Self-Insurance Debate to Dominate CAHA Meetings,. OTTAWA
CITIZEN, May 20, 1993, at D2, available in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 6839815. In a 1993
premises liability case against the town of LaSalle, Quebec, a player won an $8.7 million
judgment after he tripped in a hole in the ice and crashed into the boards. Rendered a
quadriplegic in the accident, the plaintiff successfully proved that the town was negligent
in maintaining the ice at the hockey arena. Blair Crawford, Court Upholds $8.7 Million
A ward. LaSalle May Sue Insurance Company in Hockey Injury Case, WINDSOR STAR, Feb.
23, 1995, at Al, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 3613079; THE 1974 CORPUS ALMANAC"
OF CANADA 115 (Margot J. Fawcett ed., 1974).
145. Insurance Hike, supra note 143, at B8.
146. BARNES, supra note 5, at 249; see also Don Bain, Disability Insurance Hard to
Come .by for Canadian Athletes, MANITOBA BUS., Apr. 1, 1987, at 22, available in
WESTLAW, 1987 WL 2342510.
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future lawsuits, leaving the players' parents liable for damages
exceeding the cap. 47 Hockey has yet to feel the final repercus-
sions of Steven Webber's check. If illegal checks continue to
cripple hockey players, Canadian amateur hockey may ban
checking altogether.' 4 .Although spinal injuries are declining,
CAHA will be forced, by even a few cases per year, to refrain
from insuring players, leaving participants to play at their own
risk.
149
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE UNRUH AND ZAPF DECISIONS
In spite of the uproar surrounding the potential consequences
of the Unruh decision, British Columbia's negligence standard
governs the case. As stated above, Webber failed to act as a
reasonable hockey playerwhen he hit Unruh from behind near the
boards. Moreover, Webber was aware of the possibility of serious
injury when he hit Unruh and admitted that, given the choice, he
should have avoided hitting Unruh. 50 The trial court therefore
noted that Webber's act was not only negligent, but reckless as
well.1
5 '
Critics argue that the outcome in Unruh is policy based. Did
the British Columbia Supreme and Appellate Courts intend to send
a message to CAHA regarding the rash of spinal injuries in
Canadian hockey? Unruh's case went through the courts during
147. Bert Hill, Caught in a Cash Squeeze, OTrAWA CITIZEN, Nov. 24, 1993, at C3,
available in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 6862972.
148. Id. The Zapf trial judge noted that her ruling "may restrict the fast-moving and
physical nature of the game." Zapf v. Muckalt, 11 B.C.L.R.3d 296. 314 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
149. Another player who was paralyzed after being checked into the boards headfirst,
John Millikin, has recently filed a "$13 million dollar lawsuit against hockey authorities in
Saskatchewan." David Trigueiro, Time's Come to Put an End to Hockey's Roughstuff,
CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 21, 1996, at A19, available in WESTLAW, 1996 WL 5072801.
150. Unruh v. Webber, 98 D.L.R.4th 294, 303 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1992).
151. Id. at 304. The Unruh court appears to also confuse the terms of negligence and
recklessness by using them together in the same opinion, much like the other provinces'
use of negligence with intent. Unruh's attorney, Robert D. Gibbens, points out that
[i]n theory negligence and recklessness are different concepts. Recklessness is in
Canada a standard incorporating a form of intention (it is different yet again from
gross negligence) which has no relevance to negligence. Ultimately, the rationale
for a trial courts [sic] reliance on recklessness is probably appellate review. A
trial court wants to support its liability finding on as wide a basis as possible.
Letter from Robert D. Gibbens, Barrister, Laxton & Company, to Geoffrey Moore, Staff
Member, Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal 1 (Mar. 18,
1996) (on file with author).
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the time when spinal injuries were rampant. 5 2 CAHA Director
Hal Lewis reacted to the outcome in Unruh by noting:
[W]e've also come to the conclusion that in a lot of these
situations, the court simply looks at an 18- or 19-year-old sitting
in a wheelchair and the judge says to himself, 'Somebody's got
to look after this kid for the rest of his life.' Then he puts
together the arguments to support his decision. 3
The Unruh decision may have been based on the desire to spread
the sympathetic plaintiff's loss among the -hockey playing
population and to utilize the CAHA's "deep pockets."
It is worth noting that Unruh's legal analysis is on solid ground
and also achieves the policy goals of tort law. Webber's reckless
act injured Unruh, and the goals of tort law dictate that Unruh's
loss be borne by the one causing injury.t" If there was an
underlying policy motivation in Unruh, it should be applauded.
Plaintiffs like Unruh should be compensated for paralyzing injuries
suffered at the hands of reckless fellow participants. The standard
is more difficult to apply when the injury results from negligent
conduct.
Using Unruh as a springboard, the Zapf opinion stakes out
new ground and threatens to alter the negligence framework for
participant liability., The Zapf court found that defendant Muckalt
was "at best, careless and at worst, reckless."' 55  As indicated in
part V.A, Zapf and Unruh are factually distinguishable. First, Zapf
saw Muckalt coming and was turning to engage in the check.'56
In Unruh, the plaintiff had his back to the defendant and never
turned to face his pursuer.157 Second, the referee did not impose
a penalty against Muckalt.15 1 In Unruh, Webber received a major
penalty for checking -from behind.'59 Third, Muckalt did not
intend to hit Zapf in the back. Rather, he attempted to check him
152. See supra part III.
153. Cheadle, supra note 8.
154. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §3, at
15 (5th ed. 1984).
155. Zapf v. Muckalt, 11 B.C.L.R.3d 296, 314 (Sup. Ct. 1995). See supra text accom-
panying note 151.
156. Zapf, 11 B.C.L.R.3d at 312-14.
157. Unruh v. Webber, 98 D.L.R.4th 294, 296 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1992).
158. Zapf, 11 B.C.L.R.3d at 299.
159. Unruh v. Webber, 88 B.C.L.R.2d 353, 356 (1994).
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from the side, and any contact on Zapf's back was accidental. '6°
In Unruh, the defendant intentionally hit Unruh in the back.'
61
Imposing liability in Zapf requires an ability to discern the
difference between questionable judgment and bad judgment.
Webber exercised bad judgment when he hit Unruh. Muckalt, on
the other hand, exercised questionable judgment, at worst, and
took part in an accident, at best. If accidents like this are brought
into the realm of participant liability, Zapf may raise the standard
of care for fellow participants to an unreasonable level.
VII. ALTERNATIVES TO THE UNRUHIZAPF METHOD
In the wake of Unruh and Zapf, Canadian sports law is left
standing at a crossroads. The future of Canadian participant
liability law lies in one of two possible standards, negligence or
recklessness. Each standard has benefits as well as pitfalls.
A. The Negligence Standard
Canadian courts are familiar with the negligence framework.
One commentator notes that "[tihe basis of negligence as a cause
of action is conduct that results in an unreasonable risk of harm to
another."' 62  British Columbian courts currently apply a pure
negligence analysis in participant liability and reach fairly consistent
results. The success or failure of the negligence analysis turns on
160. Zapf, 11 B.C.L.R.3d at 312-14. The court noted that
[i]t is my understanding from plaintiff's counsel that they do not dispute that if
the injury occurred as a result of a straight shoulder-to-shoulder check, the
defendants are not liable. This would be an accepted risk in the game. They say
a check from behind in any circumstances, however, is not. They take the
position that the defendant was bound to avoid contact from the rear at all costs,
once in the "danger zone," i.e., around the goal line. They say such contact could
not be consented to.
Id. at 313.
161. Unruh, 98 D.L.R.4th at 303-04.
162. Yasser, supra note 68, at 262. According to Yasser,
What is really going on in [participant liability] cases is that courts are struggling
to figure out whether or not they will allow a simple negligence cause of
action.... If the conduct can be declared intentional or reckless, its [sic] a slam
dunk. If it is negligence at most, the situation is more comparable to shooting at
a moving basket-a tough shot to make.
Id. Wisconsin recently made news in the participant liability area when it began utilizing
the negligence analysis in limited cases. Lestina v. West Bend Mut. Ins., 501 N.W.2d 28,
33 (Wis. 1993); see also Hana R. Miura, Note, Lestina v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co.:
Widening the Court as a Playing Field for Negligent Participants in Recreational Team
Contact Sports, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 1005, 1005-06; Dean P. Laing, Liability of Contact Sports
Participants, Wis. LAW., Sept. 1993, at 13, 14-15.
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whether the court appropriately considers the circumstances
surrounding the case. These circumstances remove sports cases
from the ordinary realm of negligence cases.
The Zapf court found that the circumstances in that case did
not relieve the defendant of liability. The court relied on factors
such as "speed and stresses of the game," "rules of the game," and
"assumption of risk."' 63 Here, the Canadian courts may wish to
look to the leading U.S. participant liability case in negligence,
Lestina v. West Bend Mutual Insurance.'( In Lestina, the court
considered an extensive list of factors in its negligence analysis:
To determine whether a player's conduct constitutes actionable
negligence.., the fact finder should consider such material
factors as the sport involved; the rules and regulations governing
the sport; the generally accepted customs and practices of the
sport (including the types of contact and the level of violence
generally accepted); the risks inherent in the game and those
that are outside the realm of anticipation; the presence of
protective equipment or uniforms; and the facts and circumstan-
ces of the particular case, including the ages and physical
attributes of the participants, the participants' respective skills
at the game, and the participants' knowledge of the rules and
customs.1
65
Using these factors, the Zapf court could have reached a more
equitable result by focusing more on the customs of the game and
less on the "reasonable" hockey player. The Lestina factors allow
courts to fully consider the special circumstances inherent in
participant liability cases.
The negligence standard provides courts with the tools to
achieve outcomes consistent with public policy concerns. First,
imposing liability in negligence cases would encourage sports
organizations like CAHA to maintain enough liability insurance to
cover all of its potential claims, thus spreading the loss among all
participants." Next, "negligence liability could create a strong
incentive for safety."' 67  Finally, a negligence standard would
encourage participants to educate themselves regarding the
163. Zapf, 11 B.C.L.R.3d at 312.
164. 501 N.W.2d 28 (Wis. 1993).
165. Id. at 33 (citing Niemczyk v. Burleson, 538 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)).
166. Osborne, supra note 55, at 440.
167. IiL at 441.
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inherent risks in sports and how to avoid them."6
On the other hand, the negligence standard has a number of
potential policy drawbacks. First, the prima facie case for
negligence is easier to establish than for recklessness. The easier
standard, in turn, may foster excessive litigation. 69 Second, this
easier standard may lead to excessive verdicts.'70  Excessive
verdicts, in turn, may severely hinder defendants with no liability
insurance.'7 Finally, "fear of negligence liability" may reduce
the number of participants and support staff involved in sporting
events.7 2
The Canadian courts have always used a form of negligence in
their analysis, and the application of a simple negligence standard
would put them on the cutting edge in the participant liability area.
B. The Recklessness Standard
A recklessness standard offers perhaps the closest fit to the
Canadian participant liability tradition. 3  First, recklessness sets
a higher "threshold for tort liability,"'74 requiring sports par-
ticipants to engage in conduct beyond mere negligence before
imposing liability. 5  Second, a recklessness standard virtually
mimics the analysis in most of the Canadian participant liability
168. Id. at 44041.
169. Id. at 439. One commentator counters that, while fears of mass litigation are
justified, these fears are exaggerated. In his view, juries are
less likely to allow recovery for a plaintiff unless they consider the conduct of a
defendant severe and a violation of the rules or a blatant disregard for the
ordinary care of co-participants. Moreover, jurors who also participate in sports
tend to maintain a preconceived notion that assumption of the risk will bar
liability of defendants.
Ian M. Burnstein, Note, Liability for Injuries Suffered in the Course of Recreational Sports:
Application of the Negligence Standard, 71 U. DE-T. MERCY L. REv. 993, 1021 (1994).
170. Burnstein, supra note 169, at 1021.
171. Osborne, supra note 55, at 438. Ultimately, judgments against uninsured
defendants may not be satisfied. Id.
172. Id. at 439.
173. Recklessness is the majority standard in the United States. Yasser, supra note 68,
at 254-55; see also Mel Narol, Sports Participation with Limited Litigation: The Emerging
Reckless Disregard Standard, 1 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 29, 30 (1991). Cf. Gerald J.
Todaro, Allocation of Risk Based on the Mechanics of Injury in Sports: A Proposed
Presumption of Non-Fault, 10 HASTINGS COMM. & EN, T. LJ. 33, 35 (1987) (proposing a
rebuttable presumption of non-fault in participant liability cases).
174. Lazaroff, supra note 9, at 198.
175. See Hackbart v. Clark, 601 F.2d 516, 524 .(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931
(1979); Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258, 261 (Il1. App. Ct. 1975); Turcotte v. Fell, 50
N.E.2d 964, 969-70 (N.Y. 1986).
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cases. The courts in Temple, Sexton, Conger, and Knockwood
premised their rulings on the presence or absence of the defen-
dant's recklessness or intent to injure.176 Although these courts
utilized a negligence framework, they refused to impose liability for
negligence alone.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court employed the recklessness
standard in a hockey case, Gauvin v. Clark,'77 and reached a
result strikingly similar to the aforementioned cases. In Gauvin,
the defendant and the plaintiff were jostling for position following
a face-off." 7  As the -action moved up the ice, the defendant
"butt-ended"'79 the plaintiff in the abdomen."8° Gauvin lost his
spleen as a result of the blow.'
Gauvin won $30,000 in damages following a jury trial.t" The
jury found that Clark merely acted negligently, not recklessly, and
the trial court entered judgment in favor of Clark."s On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts needed to select a standard
of care in this case of first impression."s4 They chose the reck-
lessness standard and reversed the lower court's judgment.'"
Allowing the imposition of liability in cases of reckless disregard
of safety diminishes the need for players to seek retaliation
during the game or future games .... Precluding the imposition
of liability in cases of negligence without reckless misconduct
furthers the policy that "vigorous and active participation should
not be chilled by the threat of litigation."'"
The language of the Massachusetts Supreme Court mirrors the
Canadian majority approach to participant liability. The adoption
176. See supra part II.B.
177. 537 N.E.2d 94 (Mass. 1989).
178. Id. at 95. A "face-off' occurs after stoppages of play. DREAYER, supra note 1, at
13. The referee drops the puck between two opposing players, and they attempt to "knock
the puck to a teammate." Id.
179. "Butt-ending" occurs when "[a] player attempts or actually makes contact with an
opponent by jabbing the gripped-end of the stick into him. The result is a major and a
game misconduct penalty." DREAYER, supra note 1, at 63.
180. Gauvin, 537 N.E.2d at 95.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 96.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 96-97.
185. Id. at 96.
186. Id. (citing Hackbart v. Clark, 601 F.2d 516, 521 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
931 (1979); Kabella v. Bouschelle, 672 P.2d 290, 294 (N.M. 1983)); see Lazaroff, supra note
9, at 212; Yasser, supra note 68, at 259.
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of a similar recklessness standard would allow a smooth transition
for Canadian courts in this area. The recklessness standard
provides sound footing for the Canadian courts, as opposed to the
self-contradictory negligence coupled with intent standard.
The drawbacks inherent in the recklessness standard are
indicative of the dilemma confronting sports torts in general. First,
the standard does not afford a bright line rule. It is riddled with
general terms that are subject to judicial manipulation. For
example, if the defendant in Gauvin was not reckless for butt-
ending the plaintiff in the abdomen, what constitutes recklessness
in Massachusetts?' 87
Second, the standard may be inapplicable to contact sports.
One commentator notes that "[i]f players are permitted by the
rules of the game to pursue their goals with reckless abandon, how
can they be held legally accountable in a civil action for the
inevitably injurious results of their unbounded enthusiasm?'
Indeed, physical contact is inherent in sports like hockey, and this
conflicts with the definition of recklessness: knowledge that an
action will create danger.1 89  One author states that "[a]lthough
established rules exist within the games to regulate rule infractions,
courts that adopt the recklessness standard tend to hold rule
violations as inherent in the game. The failure to provide recovery
for blatant rule violations produces an inconsistent standard as well
as inconsistent recoveries."'"
On the other hand, the recklessness standard avoids the policy
pitfalls inherent in the negligence standard. The recklessness
standard promotes vigorous participation in sports by avoiding the
chilling effect of a negligence standard. t9 '
The "reckless disregard" standard is the correct approach for
courts to take in deciding when and in what matter to become
involved in sports injury litigation. It strikes the appropriate
balance between permitting an injured player to seek compen-
187. One critic of the Gauvin opinion asks, "'[W]hat type of conduct would provide
recovery under a reckless disregard standard?' This decision exemplifies the failure of
jurisdictions that accept the recklessness standard to formulate a consistent and viable
standard." Burnstein, supra note 169, at 1003.
188. Lazaroff, supra note 9, at 214.
189. Id.
190. Burnstein, supra note 169, at 1013.
191. Lazaroff, supra note 9, at 198 (citing Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258,261 (111.
App. Ct. 1975)).
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sation for a wrongfully inflicted injury and encouraging vigorous
athletic competition without the threat of a participant being
hauled into court for conduct which is a part of the game.12
Also, in setting a lower standard of care, the recklessness standard
arguably protects participants from a wave of litigation under a
more liberal negligence standard. This, in turn, would discourage
excessive verdicts. Despite its shortcomings, the recklessness
standard is the closest fit for the majority of Canadian jurisdic-
tions193 and is the best alternative for the Canadian participant
liability field.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Steven Webber's check on Melvin Unruh, like the first domino
in a long sequence, initiated a chain of events that would forever
alter amateur hockey in Canada. Large damage awards and rising
insurance costs threaten to eliminate checking from junior hockey.
A flood of spinal injuries plagued Canadian hockey for more than
fifteen years. Around the same time that Unruh collected on his
lawsuit, such paralyzing injuries decreased.
Today, Canadian courts are at a crossroads, with British
Columbia's negligence standard pitted against the other provinces'
intent requirement. Each standard has advantages and disad-
vantages. The negligence standard threatens to foster excessive
litigation. Clearly, if courts continue to punish defendants like
Muckalt for exercising questionable judgment, then participant
liability cases will flood the dockets. On the other hand, the
negligence standard, if applied with a focus on the unique cir-
cumstances inherent in sports, could achieve the policy goals of tort
law by compensating victims, punishing negligent participants, and
forcing all competitors to act in "reasonable" manner in the
sporting arena.
The negligence standard coupled with the intent requirement
is inherently inconsistent and tends to deny recovery to legitimate
claimants. For example, under an intent to injure standard, Unruh
would have been unsuccessful, because the trial court specifically
found that Webber did not intend to hurt Unruh. 94 Lowering
the standard of care from negligence to recklessness may resolve
192. Narol, supra note 173, at 40.
193. See infra part II.B.
194. Unruh v. Webber, 98 D.L.RAth 294,294-95 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
1996] 669
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
the intent requirement problem. Recklessness affords defendants
with more protection by requiring that they disregard the high
probability of serious injury before imposing liability. This
standard attempts to balance the need for vigorous athletic
competition with the need to compensate injured participants. The
adoption of a recklessness standard would help put Canadian
participant liability on a level playing field.
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